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Spatially di⁄erentiated duopolists set higher-than-monopoly prices at some
distances. This phenomenon is shown to occur in any ￿nite-dimensional
space for a class of reservation prices that covers concavity and convexity in
perceived distance from a design. But an upper bound on the equilibrium
duopoly price converges monotonically and quickly to the monopoly price
in dimensionality. If consumers care about su¢ ciently many features of the
product (a very small number of criteria is enough), monopoly nearly leads
to an extreme price.
JEL Codes: D40, D43, L10, L43, C72Competition in a market with spatially dispersed tastes can lead to higher
equilibrium prices when the varieties are closer, or better substitutes. The
pathological case in which a ￿rmacting as a di⁄erentiated Bertrand oligopolist
(demand-constrained by competition) sets a strictly lower price than the same
￿rm acting as a monopolist (ignoring competition) was recognized by Green-
hut, Hwang, and Ohta [6] in 1975. But thirty years later, the discovery has
not changed the way applied economists and regulators view monopolies and
trusts. The principle that rivalry is price-reducing and welfare-improving
remains canonical.
Exceptions exist quite generally. Sanner [11] recently showed that, in
a Hotelling-style bounded line market (with elastic demand), entry more
typically raises the equilibrium price of an incumbent monopolist than re-
duces it, at least if brand locations are non-strategic. (If they are pro￿t-
maximzing, the possibility persists.) We will demonstrate that there are "in-
ferior duopolies" (pricing above monopoly) in all unbounded ￿nite-dimensional
Euclidean spaces (with the usual quasilinear preferences and uniform type
density). The support for the phenomenon always has positive measure, and
this motivates our central question: is inferior duopoly relevant to competi-
tion policy? Can it be substantially worse than monopoly?
Rather unexpectedly, we are able to rule out that the duopoly price ex-
ceeds the monopoly price substantially, regardless of whether reservation
prices are convex or concave in personal distance from the brand. An up-
per bound on duopoly price converges monotonically and quickly to the
monopoly price in the "re￿nement" of tastes. By this we mean the num-
ber of product features consumers distinguish, or the dimensionality of the
space in which subjectively ideal bundles of characteristics are distributed.
A small degree of re￿nement ensures that the highest possible duopoly price
is very close to the monopoly price.
The ￿rst building block of the paper is the proof that inferior duopoly
exists in ￿nite-dimensional type spaces. First we give an intuitive geometric
1explanation in the plane. In Section 3 we set out assumptions and derive
demands and elasticities. Only the standard quadratic distance cost model
is su¢ ciently tractable, so we fully develop this case. A unique equilibrium
is shown to exist in symmetric prices; in other models, it can be veri￿ed that
￿rst- and second-order conditions are satis￿ed at a symmetric "local" equi-
librium; for global concavity we must refer to simulations. These technical
points, leading to the inferior duopoly theorem, are the subject of Section
4. The theorem complements some related results in the literature for ￿xed
spaces of one or two characteristics.
Although a highly di⁄erentiated duopoly always results in higher equilib-
rium prices than monopoly, the premium is extremely small when as few as
￿ve product features are choice criteria. This is implied by our central theo-
rem in Section 5, monotonic convergence of maximal prices to the monopoly
price (in re￿nement of the preference model). The ￿ ipside of quick conver-
gence is that little dimensionality is needed to achieve a given bound on this
price ratio. Hence realistic preferences almost certainly belong to a model
where the worst duopoly is barely distinguishable from monopoly in prices.
This is not quite the same as ruling out large welfare improvements
through monopoly, because brand distance is not a constant in the argu-
ment. When di⁄erent pockets of the space are served in monopoly and
maximal-price duopoly, a strong welfare criterion like Pareto￿ s is not infor-
mative. Consumer and total surplus increase in duopoly with brand distance
at any given prices; the maximal duopoly price is therefore not the surplus-
minimizing price. We do not delve deeply into this issue, since the basic
e¢ ciency aspect of locations is a separate matter and sensitive to our neglect
of entry. In practice, prices may be the most useful indicators of welfare
properties.
The appendices contain many technical details of the analysis, in par-
ticular the construction of gradients and the proof of price symmetry. An
annotated and menu-based Matlab program is available from the author to
2generate numerical solutions and plots relating to the paper.
1 Geometry of the Pricing Puzzle
Product designs can be viewed as points in in￿nite-dimensional space: unique
combinations of strengths in characteristics, which are represented by the
coordinates. Only n of the characteristics are regarded as distinguishing fea-
tures by consumers; individually preferred designs ("types") are therefore
points in an n-dimensional subspace. A type￿ s perceived distance from an
available design is constructed as the distance from the design￿ s projection
into n-space (thus, distance in "irrelevant" dimensions is treated by con-
sumers as nil).
Distances from a design re￿ ect varying willingness to pay. If the distribu-
tion of points in the space (types) is uniform and the metric is Euclidean, then
the set of types willing to pay a given price for a design is an n-dimensional
sphere, the design￿ s "market." When two designs set prices such that their
markets do not intersect, we refer to them as local monopolists; else they are
local duopolists. A monopolist is not locally constrained by the presence of
a rival; within some neighborhood, changes in location would make no dif-
ference to its pricing problem. A duopolist has consumers in its market who
are indi⁄erent between the varieties at prevailing prices and would switch to
a cheaper one if the designs were marginally closer. One might then expect
that a smaller distance between designs induces lower prices.
If this were generally true, duopoly prices could never exceed the monopoly
price. The argument is, however, not quite correct. We mustn￿ t confound
the "sunk" reduction in demand, owing to encroachment, with what is at-
tributable to pricing. Since a ￿rm with a closer substitute has fewer interior
customers (who strictly prefer the design, given prices), it may have fewer
marginal consumers, even though individual costs of switching to the rival
design are reduced. Figure 1 illustrates that a slight nearing between the
3Figure 1: Price increase vs. decrease when distance shortens marginally
design locations (compare top with bottom) can lead to a larger marginal set
(left) or a smaller marginal set (right).1
The optimal price resolves a tradeo⁄between extracting as much revenue
as possible from consumers in the interior of the demand region and retaining
the marginal consumers in the boundary. Closer competition among products
that are relatively poor substitutes (right panel) can be favorable to a price
increase when the margin thins su¢ ciently to o⁄set the contraction of the
interior, so that smaller revenue loss o⁄sets smaller revenue gain. When the
designs are close, the indi⁄erence hyperplane is su¢ ciently responsive for
incentives to reduce price to dominate.
1Readers who are familiar with the geometry will recognize that the diagram depicts
the quadratic distance cost model, where the set of consumers who are indi⁄erent between
the designs is a hyperplane. The hyperplane passes through all intersections of the sphere
surfaces, as a simple consequence of transitivity: the surface intersections contain types
who are indi⁄erent between no purchase and either design, so they must be indi⁄erent
between designs.
4Now consider local monopolies (at optimal prices) whose markets just
touch. Prices rise in the transition to a duopoly regime because it is more
expensive for a ￿rm that faces competition to capture consumers at the
boundary. While the monopolist bids against the numeraire, the duopolist
bids against a rival design, which is necessarily more valuable to a type who
is in the rival￿ s market. The duopolist must therefore o⁄er a larger price
reduction to achieve a given expansion of its market area. Implicitly, it is
suboptimal even to maintain the monopoly price, and price increases instead.
This is the phenomenon we are concerned with, and which we will ascertain
in a type space of arbitrary (￿nite) dimensionality.
These heuristic observations suggest that equilibrium prices increase at
the transition from monopoly to duopoly, and beyond for some (smaller) dis-
tances. The maximal duopoly price lies somewhere in that interval. But our
analysis is intended to make a counterpoint that is not apparent graphically:
the maximal price is almost indistinguishable from the monopoly price for
any preference model we consider, if it allows for a plausible number of choice
criteria (dimensions of di⁄erentiation). The result is of some practical inter-
est in itself, since it provides a subtly di⁄erent rationale for antitrust policy.
It also illustrates that theoretical exceptions to economic intuition are worth
quantifying; in this case, intuition is essentially vindicated.
2 Demand Aggregation and Elasticity
As is customary in spatial models, we take the perceived distance (of an
individual from a design in Rn, where xi is the distance in dimension i) to








5types like x are uniformly distributed in the n-space. Reservation prices have
the form
￿(x) = v ￿ d
k (x)t; (1)
where v > 0 is the ideal value of the good (willingness to pay for a hypotheti-
cal design that matches x￿ s type) and t > 0 ("transport cost") is the discount
required per unit of perceived distance. Marginal utility of the good is zero
after consuming the ￿rst unit. We shall consider k 2 (0;2], i.e. concave and
convex distance aversion; however, an analytical proof of global equilibrium
is only feasible when k = 2.2
D￿ s market is the set fx : ￿(x) ￿ p ￿ 0g, an n-sphere with radius r =
d(￿ x) such that ￿(￿ x) = p. Since reservation prices decrease in distance from
the brand, radius decreases in price. In local duopoly the set of "bimarginal"
types, who are indi⁄erent between designs D and D0 at prices p and p0 and
belong to both markets, has positive measure; in monopoly it has measure
zero. A duopoly regime is illustrated in Figure 2, where the design loci D
and D0 are separated by a distance ￿.3
D￿ s demand region fx : ￿(x) ￿ p ￿ 0; ￿(x) ￿ p ￿ ￿(x0) ￿ p0g is the in-
tersection of its market with the region where D is preferred to D0. This
region is a halfspace, bounded by a hyperplane of indi⁄erent types, if and
only if p = p0 or the power of the distance function is 2.4 There is little
2With k in this interval, dk is submodular (@2dk=@xi@xj ￿ 0); larger distances in
component features mostly determine perceived distance from a design. But the immediate
reason for the restriction is that it will make payo⁄s quasiconcave. In the modular case
k = 2, features are "independent" in that dissatisfaction with one feature does not a⁄ect
the discount required for distance in other features. This is what makes the indi⁄erence
set a hyperplane.
3The perfect symmetry of the geometry implied by Euclidean distance allows us to
treat the line through D and D0 as parallel to one of the axes of the coordinate system;
that is, the analysis is invariant to rotation. Hence the vertical distance between D and
D0 is zero without loss.
4For k = 2, this can be con￿rmed directly from the indi⁄erence condition ￿(x) ￿ p =
￿0 (x) ￿ p0 (where ￿0 is the reservation price function for design D0 and p0 is the actual
price). For any k, the equality holds when prices are symmetric and d(x) = d0 (x) (d0 is
distance from D0); such points x form a hyperplane too.
6Figure 2: Notation
tractability when one cannot work with hyperplanes. For this reason we
use the standard quadratic model (k = 2) to derive aggregate demand and
present a fully functional example. We can show explicitly in this case that
prices are symmetric in Nash equilibrium.
Although the hyperplane environment applies to any other power of the
distance function in the neighborhood of symmetric prices, we cannot prove
that such prices are global equilibria without constructing aggregate demand
functions. Strictly speaking, we must employ a weaker equilibrium concept
where strategies are only local best responses. We are willing to do this
without behavioral justi￿cations because our numerical investigations suggest
that payo⁄s are always globally quasiconcave; thus local equilibria are also
Nash equilibria. In our judgement, the premise that indi⁄erent sets are
hyperplanes, at prices relevant to our comparative statics, is safe whenever
the metric is Euclidean.
In the quadratic case k = 2 then, or at symmetric prices, this hyperplane
is orthogonal to DD0 and passes through every point in the boundary of both
market spheres (the statements are equivalent).5 These observations give
5Orthogonality may be proven directly by re￿ ecting a line segment between D and any
point y in the indi⁄erence set over DD0. The image of y must be in the indi⁄erence set
7rise to a geometry in which we can calculate aggregate demand. We pause
to summarize the economic assumptions underlying the geometry. (i) There
are two designs located in bounded subsets of Rn, n ￿ 2. (ii) Ideal points
form a continuum of "su¢ cient" expanse and uniform density (magnitude 1)
in the neighborhood of each design.6 Perceived distances are Euclidean. (iii)
Every type values the ideal design identically and irrespectively of supplier
(no quality di⁄erence). (iv) Marginal utility of the numeraire is constant and
independent of type. In particular, reservation prices have the form (1), with
k = 2 where we entertain asymmetric prices. (v) Individuals demand either
one or zero units of the branded good, so as to maximize the (positive) di⁄er-
ence between reservation price and selling price. (vi) Marginal cost of supply
is constant (without further loss, zero). (vii) Pricing is nondiscriminatory
and independently pro￿t-maximizing.
Two sets of comments are in order to convince the reader that the as-
sumptions are neither likely to suppress the pricing phenomenon from Section
2, nor are generally unreasonable. In order to bound the duopoly price, we
should specify the model so that it is most conducive to a high price. The
restrictions we impose are often relaxed in economic modeling such that (a)
marginal utility of the good declines smoothly, not abruptly (hence con-
sumers may buy more than one unit at a time), and (b) marginal utility of
wealth is not constant, but declines. If we adopted (a), then the incentive
for a price increase would always be smaller because interior clients reduce
their purchases, so that the revenue gain is diminished. With (b), the mar-
gin widens as consumers are more averse to paying high prices; hence the
revenue loss from a price increase is greater. Since we are interested in high
duopoly prices, one-or-none individual demands and the absence of wealth
e⁄ects involve no further loss.
- because the distance from D and D0 is unchanged. The second claim derives from the
transitivity of preferences; see footnote 1.
6Su¢ cient for the markets never to extend into a vacuum at reasonable prices: they
are indeed spheres.
8The restrictions on design locations within Rn are interpreted as techno-
logical constraints; as we have explained, n-dimensionality is owed to con-
sumers￿perceptions in a given preference model. We do not cover the line
space (n = 1) because it poses special equilibrium existence problems. For
this case, the price e⁄ect of competition, which can be positive as in higher-
dimensional spaces, is fully discussed in Ohta [10], Greenhut, Norman, and
Hung [7], and Sanner [11]. The uniform type distribution is common to most
related literature; it introduces no arbitrary distortions. Since Hotelling [8] it
is traditional to assume bounded type distributions. The image of the linear
city, invoked by Hotelling, makes it plausible that the potential market comes
somewhere to an end, and that sellers could hypothetically locate at these
endpoints. But the literal spatial metaphor is exceptional in this respect.
People are capable of imagining and desiring varieties that cannot currently
be produced (and yet buy existing designs); so "local unboundedness" seems
more natural.
A monopolist￿ s demand is the volume of an n-sphere. The formula is
derived in Appendix A:7
Q
m








(We will often omit making the arguments of a function explicit; e.g. radius






since ￿(r) = v ￿ rkt = p.
Although k is assumed ￿xed at 2 for the purpose of demand aggregation
in this section (which encompasses asymmetric prices), we carry k forward
as a variable so that the relationship between models at symmetric prices is
7￿(￿) is the gamma (or generalized factorial) function.
9transparent.
A duopolist loses the mass Ln (r;r0), the volume of a "spherical cap," to
competition. The spherical cap may be thought of as a string of (n ￿ 1)-
dimensional spheres with radii
p


















This integral has no closed form, but it can be calculated for n = 1 and
n = 2, and there exists a recursive expression for n. It￿ s shown in Appendix
A that the loss is explicitly8
Ln (p;p






















if n is odd, and
Ln (p;p






















if n is even. The bracketed terms vanish as cos￿ ! 1 (hence ￿ ! 0,
sin￿ ! 0), as one expects.9
The resulting expressions for the duopoly demand, Qd
n (r;r0) = Qm
n (r) ￿
Ln (r;r0), have identical price derivatives (easiest to ￿nd by di⁄erentiating
8B (￿) is the beta function, a ratio of factorials.
9The function is not unambiguously de￿ned for cos￿ = 1 and n odd (both sin￿ and
its exponent n ￿ 2j ￿ 1 are zero when j = (n ￿ 1)=2). Hence our convention to treat
cos￿ = 1 as local monopoly.
10Qd





































r ￿ ￿ cos￿
￿rsin￿
: (3)
















































is the monopolist￿ s elasticity function.
3 Inferior Duopoly
If k = 2, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in symmetric prices in every
preference model (that is, a type space of any ￿nite dimensionality n ￿ 2).
Existence can be argued in standard fashion; symmetry is more di¢ cult and
proven in Appendix B. The duopoly regime is active whenever ￿ 2 (0;￿).
For n ￿ 2, the elasticity function is continuous at the regime-switching points












11Continuity of the elasticity function ensures existence of a price equilibrium











(the best response) is continuous.
The best response is indeed well-de￿ned as a function (single-valued
everywhere). To see this, note that the duopoly payo⁄ function is increas-
ing and single-peaked (thus quasiconcave) in ￿rcos￿, as one can solve
Ed
n (p;p0) = 1 explicitly for ￿rcos￿￿ such that ￿rcos￿ < ￿rcos￿￿ if and
only if Ed
n < 1 (payo⁄increasing in price).10 Because ￿rcos￿ is linear in p,11
and duopoly payo⁄ is an increasing quasiconcave transformation, duopoly
payo⁄ is quasiconcave in p. It is easy to check that monopoly payo⁄ is con-
cave, so payo⁄ is quasiconcave for all p.
Since p￿ (~ p) is a continuous map from the compact set [0;v] into itself (if
p > v, no one buys), there exists a ￿xed point by Brouwer￿ s theorem. If best
responses were strictly monotonic, they would be well-de￿ned mutual inverse
functions, in a fully symmetric setting such as ours. Then price symmetry
is immediate; in p-p0 space, they could only intersect on the 45￿ degree line.
Returning to the heuristics of Section 1, however, a price increase may be
optimally met with a price decrease in duopoly. When p0 increases, the
indi⁄erence hyperplane shifts away from D, increasing Qd
n (the interior set
10The details are, after substituting in (4) from (3) and for @r=@p:
Ed














































is increasing in ￿rcos￿, so ￿rcos￿ < ￿rcos￿￿ =) Ed
n (p;p0) < 1 and ￿rcos￿ >
￿rcos￿￿ =) Ed
n (p;p0) > 1.
11In Appendix B we show cos￿ =
￿
￿
2 ￿ r2 + r02￿
=(2￿r), so @ (rcos￿)=@p = ￿1=(2￿t).
12measure) at all p. The surface of the demand region expands and dQd
n=dp
(the marginal set measure) also increases; if the addition to the margin is
relatively greater than to the interior, p￿ (p0) falls.
Despite the complications, equilibria turn out to be symmetric; we prove
this part of Theorem 1 in Appendix B. Note that Lemma 2, in the text, is
needed.
Theorem 1 In the quadratic model (k = 2), the pricing game has a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium: p￿ (p0￿) = p0￿ (p￿).
As we have mentioned earlier, an analog of Theorem 1 cannot be given for
other k, since it is essential to have an expression for aggregate demand at all
p. But the argument for the tractable case k = 2 is only special in relying on
indi⁄erence hyperplanes; the geometry is not abruptly di⁄erent when there
is curvature. In simulations, models in other k always seem to exhibit unique
symmetric Nash equilibria. Yet, analytically we can only claim that these
points are local equilibria (no payo⁄-improving marginal move is ignored);
the reader should bear this aspect in mind when we refer to symmetric prices
that satisfy ￿rst- and second-order conditions as equilibria.12
Lemma 2 introduces three facts about the relationship between ￿ and ￿
that are critical to all results in this section, including the price symmetry
proof in Appendix B. The argument is geometric and therefore independent
of k.
Lemma 2 (i) r(@￿=@r) = r0 (@￿=@r0).
(ii) @￿=@r > 0 () ￿ + ￿ is acute; @￿=@r < 0 () ￿ + ￿ is obtuse.
(iii) @￿=@r > 0 () @￿=@p > 0; @￿=@r < 0 () @￿=@r < 0.
Proof. In a two-dimensional slice of the space, denote the tangent to D￿ s
market boundary at an intersection with D0￿ s market boundary by T. As
12The quasiconcavity argument is valid for k 2 (0;2) at symmetric prices, since the
geometry is locally identical to k = 2 (indi⁄erent set is a hyperplane) and the elasticity
function (4) applies.
13Figure 3: r(@￿=@r) = r0 (@￿=@r0)
illustrated in Figure 3, the limiting approximation of r(@￿=@r) is a vector in
the direction of T. Similarly, r0 (@￿=@r0) is locally a vector in the direction of
T 0. By construction, each of r(@￿=@r) and r0 (@￿=@r0) is the inner product




= g ￿ h = ￿ h ￿ ￿ g = r
0@￿
@r0;
where ￿ h and ￿ g are transposes of h and g. This veri￿es (i).13
A sequence of angle-sum arguments (see Figure 4) shows that the angle
formed by g and h is ￿ + ￿.
13Equivalently, observe that the two triangles on the left are similar because they have
one equal (right) angle and one shared angle. In addition, a side adjacent to the right angle
has the same length in both triangles since radii r and r0 are varied by equal increments.
This makes the triangles identical (one can be obtained by re￿ ecting and rotating the
other).
14Figure 4: Tangents form angle ￿ + ￿
Since




(￿ + ￿ is acute) and
g ￿ h ￿ kgkkhkcos(￿ + ￿) < 0 ()
￿
2
< ￿ + ￿ < ￿
(￿+￿ is obtuse), we have established that r(@￿=@r) = g￿h > 0 if and only if
￿+￿ is acute. The same statement clearly applies to r0 (@￿=@r0) = r(@￿=@r);
dividing the inequalities respectively by r and r0 gives (iii).
￿
We are now in a position to argue the existence of inferior duopolies.
Prices are symmetric from this point on, hence we cover all k. Our strategy is
to ￿nd a duopoly situation such that D sets the monopoly price P in response
15to p0 = P. There will be a p0 neighborhood of P in which p￿ (p0) > P but the
regime continues to be duopoly. It is apparent from the duopolist￿ s elasticity
function (4) that a su¢ cient condition is @￿=@r = 0 with ￿ > 0. For by
Lemma 2 (iii), this implies @￿=@r = 0; hence Ed
n (p;p0) = E0d
n (p0;p) = Em
n (p),
so that both set their prices to the optimal monopoly price P. In addition,
by Lemma 2 (ii) ￿ + ￿ is then a right angle; with ￿ and ￿ strictly positive,
we are indeed in the interior of the duopoly regime.
The equilibrium where duopoly price equals monopoly price is associated
with the distance ￿ = r(P)cos￿ + r0 (P)cos￿. Namely, since ￿ = ￿ = ￿=4
by price symmetry and ￿ + ￿ = ￿=2,
￿ = 2r(P)cos(￿=4) =
p
2r(P):
If the designs move marginally apart, ￿ and ￿ unambiguously decrease. Since
￿ + ￿ becomes acute, @￿=@r > 0 and @￿=@r > 0, and both elasticities are
now smaller than Em
n (p) at p = p0 = P. Equilibrium prices must increase.
We therefore state:
Theorem 3 There exists a region of ￿s (brand distances) such that the sym-
metric equilibrium price exceeds the monopoly price and induces the duopoly
regime.
It is perhaps instructive to replicate this result without reference to the
constructed elasticities. Fixing ￿ at 45￿ so that it is locally invariant to price
changes, consider an arbitrary angle ￿ in the n-sphere centered at D. Say that
a ray extending from D at angle ￿ is a constrained direction if it intersects
the indi⁄erence hyperplane before it intersects the market boundary, and is
an unconstrained direction otherwise. In any unconstrained direction, the
duopolist captures demand mass r, like a monopolist, and the rate of change
with respect to a price change is @r=@p for both.
In a constrained direction, the duopolist captures mass ￿ (refer to left
panel of Figure 5). By Pythagoras￿theorem,14
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The change in demand with respect to a marginal price change is @￿=@p in
a constrained direction (see right panel of Figure 5). Another application of









































Because ￿ is constant, the set of constrained directions is unchanged from
before. Therefore, ￿=r = (@￿=@p)=(@r=@p) for all directions and, integrating















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
d￿=dp=0
:
It follows that Ed
n (p;p0) = Em
n (p)
￿ ￿
d￿=dp=0, hence p￿ (p0)jd￿=dp=0 = P. Now
again since Ed
n (P;p0) = 1, demand becomes inelastic as @￿=@p turns negative
and p￿ (p0) necessarily exceeds P.
Alternatively the case can be made starting from the regime-switching
point where ￿ = ￿ = 0 and both set the monopoly price. As distance shortens
and we enter duopoly with symmetric prices, ￿ + ￿ is initially small, hence
@￿=@p < 0 and demand is inelastic at p = P (which entails Em
n (P) = 1).
The regime change is therefore associated with a price increase: neighboring
duopoly games are always inferior to monopoly; they must result in a higher
price. This explanation is in fact simpler, but the interior duopoly point
that induces the monopoly price plays an important role in our subsequent
analysis (it￿ s the limit of the maximal price path) and is worth understanding.
The "inferior duopoly" phenomenon is, of course, not novel, although
Theorem 3 represents a considerable generalization, both to spaces of dimen-
sion n > 2 and to a wider range of convexities in distance. Greenhut, Hwang,
and Ohta [6] ￿rst commented on the possibility of a price increase when many
symmetrically arranged, identically behaved rivals move closer in the plane.
Capozza and Van Order ([2] and [3]) con￿rmed this in the context long-run
monopolistic competition, where the number of designs is determined by en-
try until pro￿ts are zero.15 A systematic and accessible treatment for the
line space is found in Sanner [11], who also considers the role of endogenous
location choice.
The cited literature allows for continuous individual demand functions;16
15Strictly speaking, these treatments do not cover the duopoly case, since the demand
region is taken to be a regular polygon (hence every design has more than two local rivals,
prices are symmetric and su¢ ciently low).
16Although these models are set in speci￿c spaces, one might suspect that our unit-
18explanations for counterintuitive price increases have therefore emphasized
the "dispensible" margins, populated with consumers who purchase the least
because they are the most distant. Our setting does not admit this inter-
pretation and accordingly o⁄ers a di⁄erent type of intuition. The extensions
we have made are of special interest because they enable us to derive the
convergence property of the next section, and show that its quantitative im-
plications are robust within a large class of models.
4 Maximal Price Equilibria
The duopoly price path in a space of dimension n satis￿es Ed
n (p;p) = 1 and
has as solutions pairings of distances ￿ with the symmetric equilibrium price.
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￿
= 1,






































We may also consider a duopoly equilibrium where the symmetric price is
the monopoly price P, hence Ed
n (P;P) = Em










From (6) and (7) follows that the maximal to monopoly price ratio can
demand model in n dimensions formally corresponds to a model in two dimensions with
some particular individual demand function. This is however not the case, except trivially
when n = 2 and the individual demand function is constant. The argument, based on a
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￿ sin
n￿1 ￿
1 ￿ 2cos2 ￿
2ncos￿
; (9)









































< 1 () P < ~ P.




















whenever n increases. This maps out the proof of our main theorem.
Theorem 4 The maximal price ~ P converges monotonically to the monopoly
price P in the dimension n of the type space.
Proof. On the maximal price path in a space of ￿xed dimension, @ ~ P=@￿ =








=@p constants and using Ed
n
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~ P; ~ P
￿ sin
n ￿ = ￿
sin￿
cos￿
1 + 2cos2 ￿
1 ￿ 2cos2 ￿




























can be factored out of Qd
n
￿
~ P; ~ P
￿
, (12) is just a relationship
between ￿ and n. On ￿ 2 (0;￿=2), the feasible duopoly scenarios given
symmetric prices, the RHS has a single discontinuity at ￿ = ￿=4 and is
increasing while ￿ < ￿=4. The LHS is always continuous and increasing
when ￿ < ￿=4. As ￿ ! 0, LHS ! 0 and RHS ! ￿1; as ￿ ! ￿=4,
LHS approaches a ￿nite value, whereas RHS ! 1. It follows that (12) has
a single solution on (0;￿=4); but we know that any angle on the maximal
price path belongs to this interval (at ￿ = ￿=4, a duopolist sets the monopoly
price), so the angle on the maximal price path, ~ A(n), is uniquely determined.
See the left panel of Figure 6.













to n in (13). As is clear from the right panel of Figure 6, the function is
monotonically increasing, concave, and convergent to 1, so that convergence






The substantial aspect of Theorem 4 is monotonicity; convergence is a
simple consequence of the "vanishing" property of hyperspheres (observable
in the volume formula), which forces all prices to zero in the limit. To gain an
intuitive understanding of this aspect, it is useful to know why hyperspheres
diminish toward zero mass. Consider expanding a one-dimensional sphere
(a line segment) of ￿xed radius 1=2 to a disk. As dimension is stepped up,
the volume measure changes: the unit square replaces the unit interval as
the basic mass element. The change of measure means that the population
of consumer types spreads out uniformly into the plane: members of unit
intervals reassemble in unit squares, maximally dispersed.
17One could make lengthy calculus arguments about the curvatures of (12) and (13),
but these are continuous univariate functions, invariant to k and parameters (v and t), so
the numerical inspection is conclusive.
22Since the de￿nition of mass is altered, a two-dimensional set maintains
its one-dimensional mass only if it acquires full height (is stretched to a
square). The disk is inscribed into the unit square, hence the mass of the
market diminishes. In a particular dimension, this tendency is sensitive to the
choice of radius;18 but for any radius, the decline occurs at some ￿nite n. The
hypersphere eventually becomes arbitrarily small relative to the hypercube
of the same radius, but this hypercube has ￿nite mass, even in the limit (it
can be packed with a ￿nite number of unit hypercubes, which have mass 1 by
de￿nition). It follows that every in￿nite-dimensional hypersphere has zero
measure.
Because demand regions are subsets of hyperspheres, their interior mass
vanishes as n ! 1, and no positive price can ultimately be an equilibrium.
This may seem strange from an economic point of view, but it re￿ ects that
the uniform "redistribution" implicit in increasing dimensionality in￿ ates the
types￿personal distances from any particular point.19 In the limit, consumers
"di⁄erentiate" themselves so much from each other and any available design
that it is impossible to attract a set that has full dimension, hence positive
measure, in the space.
Monotonicity does not follow from this argument because hypersphere
volumes increase in dimensionality for small n, which is the region of the
greatest practical interest. Again it￿ s helpful to think about changes to inte-
rior and marginal sets as n increases. The volume of the monopolist￿ s mar-
ginal set, @Qm
n (p)=@p, is closely related to the surface area of the demand
region, @Qm
n (p)=@r. A straightforward calculation shows that the volume-
to-surface-area ratio is r=n. Hence the marginal set expands relative to the
interior set, and therefore price diminishes in n. When n is increased, the
18If r 6= 1=2, then the mass equivalent of the line segment market is a square of radius p
2r (generally, (2r)
n=(n+1)). For r = 1, for example, the disk of radius 1 contains the
mass-equivalent square, hence mass increases.
19References to increases in n and changes in measure are only heuristics. Our analysis
compares "￿xed" preference models; we do not claim that there is an economic mechanism
for preferences to evolve spatially along these lines.
23type space expands orthogonally away from the axis along which D and D0
are positioned, so that duopoly competition does not constrain the addition
of depth to the bimarginal set. Because the marginal sets of a duopolist and
a monopolist are similarly a⁄ected by greater dimensionality, the interior-
to-marginal set ratios become more similar, and this induces more similar
prices.
Theorem 4 has a compelling quantitative implication: one can expect ~ P
to be very close to the monopoly price when consumers care about just a
few product features. To get a sense of the strength of this claim, we pursue































< 1, the denominator grow faster with n than the
numerator, leading to convergence. Numerically, we can see in Figure 7 that
convergence is monotonic and rapid. Even at n = 3, the price ratio is less
than 2% greater than 1 in any model; at n = 5, less than half a percent. We
emphasize that the price ratio path does not depend on the parameters v
and t; this prediction is robust for reservation prices of the form (1).
That the price ratio declines in the convexity parameter k (see the right
panel of Figure 7) is counterintuitive. Consistent with pure Bertrand com-
petition, ~ P ! 0 as k ! 0, as can be checked in (14).20 But the monopoly
price (7) also tends to zero with k, an artefact of inelastic individual demands
and the unbounded the type space. (When reservation prices are insensitive









24Figure 7: ~ P=P on maximal price path
to distance, aggregate demand is in￿nitely sensitive to price.) This is an
unrealistic feature, and makes model comparisons by convexity somewhat
uninteresting; the substantive insight is that convergence occurs quickly in
all models.
Distances ~ ￿ on the maximal price path can be characterized analytically
by substituting into rcos￿ = ~ ￿=2 from the de￿nitions of radius for each
model, and then for the maximal price. This leads to ~ ￿ = 2cos￿
￿￿




Because ￿ goes to ￿=4 as n ! 1, and ~ P to zero, the maximal-price distances
converge to limn!1 ~ ￿ =
p
2(v=t)
1=k, which decreases in k. It seems reason-
able to conjecture that large brand distances in a pro￿table (and uniformly
populated) market are likely to attract entry. With small k, the maximal
price equilibrium would then rarely be a stable arrangement.
But regarding welfare implications, the most immediate question is whether
high-price equilibria are less e¢ cient; since they imply a speci￿c range of
25Figure 8: Consumer and total surplus vs. price
brand distances, this is by no means clear. Pareto improvement is too strong
a criterion: a change in the identities of consumers served is implicit in most
comparisons. Surplus measures face a similar problem: when D moves closer
to D0, there is a loss because some customers of D0 experience an increase
in the value of D but do not switch, so that the improvement is wasted on
them. On the other hand, everyone who is made worse o⁄ by the change in
locations bears the cost. As a result, surplus measures always favor equilibria
in larger distances as can be seen in Figure 8.21
In our view, one should not dismiss the importance of price levels on
these grounds. Uniform, dense distributions are a modeling choice made
for analytical ease, but surplus is very sensitive to this stylization. Also,
21Equilibrium pro￿t, the di⁄erence between total and consumer surplus, is always in-
creasing in distance. This makes it trivial to endogenize location choice: ￿rms would
locate maximally apart in the feasible subset of the space. Hence local monopolies occur
whenever possible; else inferior duopolies, if possible.
26entrants may be expected to serve consumers that drop out of a market after a
location change. One needs to bear in mind that, in a realistic policy scenario,
relocating ￿rms is usually not an option; the question is whether some form of
entry is to be facilitated. Given that our setting is not rich enough to address
these issues, surplus measures are probably not informative. It￿ s plausible
that, on balance, an appropriate welfare measure would closely mirror the
behavior of prices.
5 Concluding Comments
Circumstantially one expects that tastes are, at least in a small degree, re-
￿ned: people use multiple purchase criteria for most products. Our analysis
suggests that a realistically low level of re￿nement su¢ ces to compress the
di⁄erence between monopoly and "inferior" duopoly into something very
small. This is fortunate from the point of view of pragmatic regulation; a
naive policy that indisciminately deters monopoly would incur no signi￿cant
loss, if we leave the pure location e⁄ects on welfare aside.
Our treatment of product di⁄erentiation with an arbitrary number of
features addresses pricing issues that could not be posed in the n-dimensional
frameworks of Anderson, Palma, and Thisse [1], Feenstra and Levinsohn
[5], and Irmen and Thisse [9], which were not designed to produce a sharp
classi￿cation of competitive regimes. One may suspect that our de￿nition of
local monopoly, which depends on pricing rather than on there being a single
￿rm, constructs the distinction from duopoly arti￿cially, so that the terms
do not have the usual meaning in this context.
The essential aspect of monopoly is that it does not have to compete, and
when pro￿t functions are well-behaved, this is economically equivalent to not
competing on the margin. Whether a ￿rm can attract custom away from
"other" industries and encounter competition is ultimately a question of how
low a price it is willing to set. At the optimal price, one local monopolist can
27disregard the other and behaves like a "traditional" monopolist. A regime
switch to local duopoly creates a bilateral margin in which individual demand
elasticity is escalated. It seems fair to interpret this as a transition to rivalry
in the usual sense.
An interesting question arising from our convergence theorem is whether
there are economic forces favoring (or precluding) taste re￿nement. Little
has been said in economics about preference evolution, but it is conceivable
that the dimensionality of the type space, where it relates to the features
consumers perceive, changes through learning. To a ￿rm, it may be a strate-
gic variable that can be manipulated by design choices and advertising. Our
comments on the convergence theorem suggest that a transition to another
type space would have to involve a functional change in the distribution. Our
analysis should be interpreted as comparative statics.
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A Appendix: Aggregate Demand Construc-
tion
A.1 Volume of an n-Sphere
Denote the volume of an n-dimensional unit sphere as Vn (1) = vn. For a
general n-sphere, Vn (r) = rnvn. Since the cross-section of an n-sphere at

















29Substituting polar notation s = rcos￿,











































For odd n, this equals Vn (r) = (2￿r2)
(n+1)=2 =(￿n!!); for even n, Vn (r) =
(2￿r2)
n=2 =n!!.
A.2 Loss to Competition
To express
Ln (p;p














2 ￿d￿ ￿ sin
n￿1 ￿cos￿















































sin￿d￿ = r(1 ￿ cos￿)
L2 (p;p




2 ￿d￿ = r
2 (￿ ￿ sin￿cos￿):
Repeated substitution into (??) generates a sequence that can be expressed
as:
Ln (p;p


































































23For n = 2, apply the double-angle formula sin






















and use another double-angle formula, sin2￿ = 2sin￿cos￿, to simplify.
31for n odd;
Ln (p;p
























A consumer at distance s from the purchased design attains surplus







The consumer surplus generated by a monopolist is then an integral over












































































It is convenient to restrict k to integer values (1 or 2) so that closed-form
expressions are available for the integral as in the demand derivation. (A gen-































































and total surplus is Sn (p;p0) = 2Cn (p;p0)+2Qd
n (p;p0)p at symmetric prices.
B Appendix: Angles and Price Symmetry
B.1 Angle Gradients
We collect here the constructions of gradients that appear throughout the pa-




















































where the ￿ in the second identity resolves to + if ￿ + ￿ < ￿=2 and to ￿ if
￿ +￿ > ￿=2. When ￿ +￿ = ￿=2, the angle is invariant to marginal changes
24To solve for @￿=@￿, use @ sin￿=@￿ = cos￿ and sin
2 ￿ + cos2 ￿ = 1.
33Figure 9: Construction of angle gradients























(not drawn, but the construction is parallel to the right panel).
Per our graphic de￿nition of ￿ (in Figure 2), rcos￿ is the distance along
DD0 between D and the indi⁄erence hyperplane. It￿ s a subtle but important
point to remember that we are in e⁄ect de￿ning the cosine function from our
model, and this de￿nition is consistent with the usual one only if k = 2. For
then, the indi⁄erent type on DD0 is characterized by
v ￿ p ￿ (rcos￿)










34and, with sin2 ￿+cos2 ￿ = 1, the equation is equivalent to a law of Euclidean
geometry: rsin￿ = rsin￿. The reader may verify that, for any k, the
de￿nition of the cosine implicit in Figure 2 satis￿es the law of sines if and
only if sink ￿ + cosk ￿ = 1.
To avoid having to keep track of di⁄erent geometries, we always use the
familiar cosine de￿ned by (15).25 Then angles are comparable, gradients
(with respect to radius) are invariant to model, and (15) can be solved for
cos￿ =
￿
2 + r2 ￿ r02
2￿r
: (16)
(because rcos￿ + r0 cos￿ = ￿). The di⁄erence between models is entirely
re￿ ected in the behavior of the radius function. Note that rcos￿ = ￿=2 if








































Corresponding expressions for D0 are found by straightforward substitutions.
If p = p0, the above simplify to @￿=@￿ = ￿1=(2rsin￿) and @￿=@r =
￿(1 ￿ 2cos2 ￿)=(￿ sin￿). When @p=@￿ = 0 (on the maximal price path),
@2￿
@r@￿






1 + 2cos2 ￿









which identi￿es relationship (11) between ￿ and n.
25As a result, if x is indi⁄erent and belongs to DD0 in model k 6= 2, then d(x) 6= cos￿
in rk ￿dk (x) = r0k ￿d0k (x) because cos￿ satis￿es (15) and is not rede￿ned within model
k 6= 2.
35B.2 Proof of Symmetric Price Equilibrium, k = 2
Existence is argued in the text; here we rule out nonsymmetric price equilibria
in the quadratic model. In local monopoly, both designs independently face
the same optimization problem with a unique solution, hence choose the same
price. We consider therefore the local duopoly case.
If the ￿rst-order conditions, Ed
n (p;p0) = E0d












































then the left sides are equal by Lemma 2 (i), and because rn and r0n can
be factored out of Qm
n and Q0m
n , leaving equal constants and rn sinn ￿ =
r0n sinn ￿.














We will di⁄erentiate (19) with respect to p and p0 and show a contradiction
with p 6= p0. To understand this argument, consider that the set of ￿xed
points, which (19) characterizes, is parameterized by the brand distance ￿.
The solutions to (19) and ￿rst-order conditions, only one of which is an
additional restriction, are one-dimensional curves in three-dimensional para-
meter space; there is one degree of freedom to change either p, p0 or ￿, and
26At this point we could directly rule out asymmetric equilibria where ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿=2.
For then @￿=@r and @￿=@r0 are negative by Lemma 2 (ii) and (iii); this implies Em
n ￿ 1
and E0m
n ￿ 1 (else the left and right sides of (17) and (18) have opposite signs). Since Em
n
is increasing in price (and demand is decreasing in price), p < p0 makes the left side of
(19) greater than the right side; conversely, p > p0 makes the right side greater than the
left side. We are, however, mainly interested in the case ￿ + ￿ < ￿=2 (where symmetric
duopoly prices will exceed the monoply price).
36satisfy (19) with optimized quantities and elasticities. Because duopoly best
responses are continuous and di⁄erentiable in p, p0 and ￿, the ￿xed-point cor-
respondence is continuous and di⁄erentiable (though not necessarily convex-
valued) in any one of these variables. Our method of proof is then to show
that continuity of the ￿xed-point correspondence is violated unless p = p0
everywhere.27
The derivatives of f (p;p0;￿) = (1 ￿ Em
n )E0m
n Qd


































































p0 = 0; (21)
where we use the equilibrium condition Ed




n=@p, (analogously for @Q0d
n=@p0), as well as (19) to factor
out demand functions.28 The rightmost bracketed terms are the cross-price
27The usual strategy is to construct the derivative dp=dp0 of the best response function
(via the implicit function theorem) and bound it between ￿1 and 1. When best response
functions are symmetric, any intersection is mirrored on the other side of the 45￿ line
in orthogonal direction. To produce an asymmetric equilibrium, i.e. one with its mirror
image not on the 45￿ line itself, the function must cross a line with slope ￿1 twice, hence
it must be steeper than ￿1 somewhere. But this approach turns out to be very tedious
here.























































































Multiplying these expressions respectively by (@￿=@r0)=(@￿=@r0) and (@￿=@r)= (@￿=@r),
and substituting from Qm
n sin
n ￿ = Q0m
n sin
n ￿ and (17),(18), (19), and (5), one arrives at:
dQd
n























































































n = (1 ￿ E
m















n = (1 ￿ E
m

















































If p < p, then the left side must be smaller than 1. But this is not
possible, given E0m
n > Em
n and that 2 ￿ n￿2
n E0m
n and 2 ￿ n￿2
n Em
n > 0 cannot
have opposite signs, from nonnegativity of prices. Only p = p0 satis￿es the
reduced equilibrium condition.
￿

































r ￿ ￿ cos￿
















2 ￿ r2 ￿ r02:
39